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I didn't have to hear the foregoing presentations to
know that this conference would be a celebration of the
promise of biotechnology. The very calling into existence
of the conference and the encouragement we received
from Governor Celeste attest to the fundamental opti-
mism with which we view biotechnology. I am all for it,
and I am glad to be a part of it. It is good for our country
and it is, perhaps, especially appropriate to Ohio at
this time.
Yet, in the longer perspective of global time, the rites
of passage of economic history involved as much or more
of the push of necessity as the pull of opportunity. And
they always involved as much or more of agony as of
ecstacy, at least at first.
By my reckoning, it is convenient to recognize three
such passages: the first is the agricultural revolution, the
second is the industrial revolution, and the third is the
technological revolution, of which this biotechnology is
such an important part.
Neither the agricultural revolution nor the industrial
revolution were much welcomed by the participants. The
coming of agriculture, first necessitated by population
pressures in some parts of the world about 13,000 years
ago and still going on in a few parts of the world today,
changed the free-roaming, hunting-foraging life that hu-
mans had enjoyed for at least 40,000 years into a work-
a-day world of drudgery. Agriculture meant that Adam
and Eve were expelled from their Garden of Eden and
were condemned to a life of labor: In the sweat of thy face
shalt thou eat bread, as the Bible puts it.
Agriculture also meant that humanity gained greater
managerial control over economic productivity, and,
after achieving some efficiency, it made vastly larger
populations possible. That the coming of agriculture
eventually came to represent a giant step forward in
human progress was probably never appreciated by the
Adams and Eves who reluctantly had to give up their old
ways of life in their Gardens of Eden.
Similarly, the industrial revolution, which began in
Britain about 200 years ago and is still being hotly waged
in the developing economies of the world today, was
not initially much welcomed. The social disintegration,
the environmental destruction, and the personal dehu-
manization that it caused are well and amply documen-
ted, and the various fascist, socialist, Marxist, Maoist
conflagrations that it sparked into existence are still
flaring up today.
But industrialism also enlarges humanity's managerial
control over economic productivity, and once it becomes
established and efficient, it makes vastly larger popu-
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lations and greatly increased standards of living possible.
That industrialization is a giant step forward in human
progress was probably never appreciated by the child
laborers, the robotized workers in the satank mills, and
the armies of the hopelessly unemployed who experienced
the early days of industrialism as a grist mill of human
degradation.
Can we expect a more benign transition during the
current technological revolution? This is the major ques-
tion underlying this conference today. Some doubts were
expressed in the Cullis, Wagner, and Janson-Pavlakovic
papers presented earlier. Our anxiety about Big Brother
super computers operated by our governments, about the
destruction of our gene pool through radiation or chem-
istry, about Three Mile Island or Bophal-type environ-
mental disasters happening or happening again, about an
Andromeda Strain threatening pandemics, or, ultimately,
about a nuclear holocaust putting an end to us all, indi-
cates that technology does not come into our lives with-
out some second thoughts.
The fact that technology, once it has the wrinkles
ironed out — pocket calculators, coronary by-passes, air-
line reservations computers, and teflon coatings come to
mind — vastly enhances humanity's managerial control
over economic productivity may be a lost promise to the
victims of its distresses. But the technological revolution
is different from both the agricultural and the industrial
revolutions in one important way: technology itself
involves practically no substance; it is intangible, an
ephemeral figment of the mind.
This means that the technological bases of economic
production do not need to replace the previous industrial
or agricultural ones. By contrast, when agriculture super-
sedes hunting-foraging, the farmers force the hunter-
foragers off the land and into oblivion. This is what the
ancient Babylonian farmers did to the wandering Meso-
potamian tribes over ten thousand years ago, what the
European settlers did to the American Indians just a few
centuries ago, and what the Japanese immigrant ranchers
are doing to the native jungle peoples along the Amazon
River today. Industrialization was equally intolerant
in its victory. The introduction of industrial factories,
iron and steel, and fossil fuels annihilates handcraft
manufacture and agriculture and the economic and social
structures associated with these so completely that
handcrafting remains only as an entertaining oddity and
tourist attraction, where it remains at all.
Technology is also a force for change, but it is not built
on the ownership of land or physical capital. Therefore,
it need not be a death sentence on the existing land and
capital owning economic order. Instead of having to re-
place it, technology insinuates itself into and onto the
older order, altering it, enhancing its economic produc-
tivity, but not necessarily getting rid of it. Farmers,
instead of being threatened by technology, see it as their
most important opportunity for greater yields and greater
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profits. Industrialists, likewise, and most urgently in
Ohio, see technology as their main key to unlocking the
trap of obsolescence and stagnation. Even workers, who
have suffered the most conspicuous displacements
through technology and who have put some of the most
violent episodes against new technologies on the record of
economic history — the saboteurs and the Luddites come
immediately to mind — have, nevertheless, benefitted
mightily from them, as mechanical energies and modern
systems relieved them of much of the physical sweat that
has been our earthly destiny since our expulsion from the
Gardens of Eden.
This is clearly implied in the Cullis, Janson et al., and
Wagner presentations we heard this morning and in the
luncheon address by Dr. Eichel we heard this noon. And
this is the source of the almost unanimous spirit of wel-
come with which technology is greeted in progressive
circles and with which it is greeted here today.
Technology's intangibility presents some other vari-
ances from previous economic orders. Unlike land and
capital, the same technology can be owned by two or
more people at the same time. That is, the knowledge
that I own can also be knowledge that you get to own,
without my having to give up my ownership of that
knowledge. (When students learn from teachers, the
teachers are not drained of their knowledge.) This mar-
velous, almost infinite, and relatively inexpensive multi-
plicability of technology is utterly different from the
physical fixity of land, capital, and hours of labor, where
what I own you can't possibly own at the same time.
This means that technology is the most accessible of all
factors of production. This also makes it the most com-
patible with free enterprise and democracy, because no
permanent technological elite comparable to the landed
aristocracy or to capitalism's family fortunes is likely to
develop. Stanford and M. I. T. cannot monopolize hi-
tech; neither can Silicon Valley or Route 128. More than
ever before, since the agricultural and industrial revolu-
tions, personal intelligence and vigor — not necessarily
bequeathable quantities — will determine the ownership
of technology and, thus, the distribution of income,
social status, and power. Furthermore, since technology
is, by nature, transitory, accumulations based on tech-
nology are not likely to be long lived. Social mobility and
individual opportunity will be greatly increased in an
economy that is largely based on technology.
Also, since technology is intangible, proprietary
claims on it are difficult to enforce. Land may be fenced
off and physical capital may be patrolled by security
guards. But, patents, copyrights, and strictest secrecy
notwithstanding, technology lends itself nicely to bor-
rowing, imitation, replication, and theft. It can be car-
ried away in the brain, the way the plans to the British
spinning jenny were carried to the infant textile industry
in Rhode Island two centuries ago, in the head of an
apprentice machinist with a photographic memory. Or it
can be whisked off on a micro chip, magnetic tape, or
disc, as seems to be the style today. Compounding the
problem is the likelihood that the owner does not imme-
diately realize that the technology has been taken, since
he or she remains in full possession of it.
Other forms of mischief may also become more effi-
cient. The insubstantiality of technology makes it a much
more difficult weapon to defend against than the more
obvious guns, tanks, or aircraft. Furthermore, an attack
may not even evoke an alarm, much less a response,
because the technological damage to such targets as data
banks, information systems, and even gene pools can
occur without the usual noise, ruckus, and physical af-
fronts that typically accompany more traditional attacks.
Biotechnology is especially threatening in this regard,
because it functions via natural biological processes that
may be the least likely to be suspected. The mind wants
to shrink back at the potential for terrorism and sabotage
thus made available, but the issue must be faced.
As the Howland presentation we heard this morning
and Dr. Eichel's luncheon speech indicate, biotechnology
presents special problems to its owners in defending their
proprietary claims. Biotechnology is different from elec-
tronic, chemical, or mechanical technology in that it is
most likely to be transmitted via living genes, rather
than only via such controlled artifices as learned papers
and electronic data storage and retrieval devices. Also,
the finished product of advanced biotechnology resides
in a living plant or animal (or fungus, bacteria, etc.)
Therefore, the information on which the advanced
biotechnology is based is turned loose into that most
intimate part of the natural world that has always been
regarded as an unlikely object of enforceable proprietary
claims. If an I. B. M. or a Hewlett-Packard are suffering
from leaks and thefts of their electronic technology, at
least they are not seeing it being blown far and wide as
so much hi-tech pollen on the four winds, which, unfor-
tunately, is not an unlikely kind of fate for the products
of biotechnology.
This difference between electronic, chemical, or me-
chanical inanimate technology and biotechnology helps
explain why the former has made so many more con-
spicuous advances. Inanimate technology, even though it
is hard to protect, is still more easily and more enforce-
ably claimed than is biotechnology as a base from which
private profits can be generated. The research and devel-
opment of Silicon Valley are almost all done by private
enterprise and are overwhelmingly driven by the profit
motive, although intellectual curiosity and other platonic
motives also operate to some degree. By contrast, the
largest proportion of biotechnological research today is
still done by universities and government research labora-
tories. It can only be driven by intellectual curiosity,
scientific status seeking, and, perhaps, some interest in
national or regional economic development.
Until capital investments in biotechnological research
can be protected, the profit motive cannot be as directly
engaged in biotechnology as it is in inanimate tech-
nology, and biotechnology will never really have a tiger
in its tank. Careful legal work, like that in the Howland
presentation, and very much more of it will be needed to
increase the (always imperfect) protection of the profits
from biotechnology. Indeed, this is likely to happen
soon. Profit opportunities have a way of becoming en-
forceable. When the American Indian Chief Tecumseh
was asked to sell a parcel of land to some early settlers,
he denied that possibility, insisting that it was as impos-
sible to own land as it was to own the wind or the rain.
How quickly that outlook changed!
But all this analysis of the ownership of technology in
general and of biotechnology in particular should not
obscure the fundamental characteristic of technology:
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that, unlike land and capital, it is insubstantial, not
directly bequeathable, and very transitory. It is not some-
thing that can be owned permanently, but something
that must be continuously cultivated and advanced. And,
unlike the coming of agriculture and the coming of in-
dustry, the coming of technology does not threaten to
annihilate the existing economic order.
We should also remember that those who would best
use it to their advantage are those who best apply their
personal intelligence and vigor to it. Material accumu-
lations of inanimate capital and land — the basis of agri-
cultural and industrial productivity — will count for less.
Mental effectiveness and adaptability will be prime mov-
ers. For the first time, then, since Adam and Eve were
condemned to a life of agricultural and industrial drudg-
ery, these original characteristics evolved in humanity
become central to the human condition. Once again, our
futures now depend less on substantial proprietary claims
and more on the qualities within us. I think that this
is a good omen for biotechnology, for America, and
for Ohio.
